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ABOUT THIS WORKING PAPER
As a cohort of people, ‘children in work’ have become critical to the everyday 
functioning of diverse supply chain systems. This Working Paper considers 
diverse commodity chains (leather, waste, recycling and sex) to explore the 
business realities that generate child labour in its worst forms. A review of the 
literature finds that occurrence of the worst forms of child labour (WFCL) in 
supply chain systems is contingent on the organising logics and strategies 
adopted by actors in both the formal and informal economies. Piecing 
together the available evidence, the paper hypothesises that a supply chain 
system is sensitive to the use of WFCL when downward pressure to take on 
business risk cannot be matched by the economic resilience to absorb that 
risk. Emergencies and persistent stressors may increase risk and reduce 
resilience, shifting norms and behaviour. There is a need for further work to 
learn from business owners and workers in the informal economy.
The Child Labour: Action-Research-Innovation in South and South-Eastern Asia (CLARISSA) 
is a consortium of organisations committed to building a participatory evidence base and generating 
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1 INTRODUCTION
When children go to work, they usually serve a supply 
chain of some description. When looking across all 
the varied sectors in which children work, one can 
observe the diverse, dynamic, and evolving nature of 
supply chains. They present as complex systems that 
require an understanding of the interconnections and 
interdependencies that combine and recombine to 
generate opportunities for children to work. Very little 
about the socioeconomic reality of supply chains is linear, 
despite the imagery that the term ‘chains’ conjures in our 
mind’s eye. 
Through scoping studies in leather supply chains in 
Bangladesh, the fishing and waste recycling sectors in 
Myanmar, and the adult entertainment sector in Nepal, 
the Child Labour: Action-Research-Innovation in South 
and South-Eastern Asia (CLARISSA) programme has 
begun to operate within the complex socioeconomic 
realities of supply chains. This has resulted in:
• a broader understanding of supply chains to 
include ‘human chains’ – chains of supply where 
the child is the commodity being traded;
• a specific interest in the worst forms of child 
labour (WFCL), with an understanding that the 
push and pull factors which generate child 
labour in its worst forms may be distinct from the 
dynamics influencing child labour more generally;
• a high-level theory of change, which connects 
incidence of WFCL to informal spheres of 
supply chains.
This Working Paper pieces together available evidence 
about supply chains, the informal economy, and WFCL 
to map potential links and pathways between business 
realities and experiences and the prevalence of WFCL. 
It conceptualises a more detailed theory of change in 
the form of a systems map to inform the programme’s 
thematic research agenda.
1.1 An interest in the supply 
chain system
As with the study of other complex systems, it is the 
nature of the supply chain system – its structure and 
dynamics – that we want to understand. Essentially, what 
can we learn about the way business happens in supply 
chains that teaches us something about WFCL? 
Table 1 shows the key focal areas of the CLARISSA 
programme, which informed the scoping for this Working 
Paper. We see that the sectors and the nature of the 
work are very different. But we also infer that the different 
supply chains share similar elements: they are made up 
of tangible things – markets, factories, places of work, 
transport hubs, shops, products – connected by intangible 
things like history, worldviews, context, and culture. The 
supply chains that trade leather are very distinct from 
the human chains that use children in the trade of sex, 
but they may also share aspects of their structure (e.g. 
social norms, places of work) and dynamics (e.g. market 
prices, power asymmetries) that make a supply chain 
system susceptible to WFCL. These less visible forces 
that characterise the supply chain system may be similar 
across different commodity lines, including human chains.
This Working Paper uses the diverse supply chains of 
the CLARISSA programme as a basis for exploring the 
structure and dynamics of supply chain systems. It is 
based on a literature review of these commodity lines, 
predominantly within South Asia and Southeast Asia. 
Given the limited number of studies that have looked 
at how business is done in supply chains from the 
perspective of WFCL, the review occasionally refers to 
research that has taken place in other regions and with 
different commodities, such as the processing of sugar 
cane in Latin America. This is especially the case when 
research and practice had something to say about how 
supply chain systems have evolved into socioeconomic 
entities that use WFCL.
1.2 A focus on the informal economy
In its scoping studies in Bangladesh, Myanmar, and 
Nepal, the CLARISSA programme discovered that WFCL 
are often ‘hidden’ from view in informal workplaces, illegal 
sectors, and dangerous work practices. This evolved 
a research focus towards the micro and small-scale 
entrepreneurs who operate largely within the informal 
economy, but who intersect with global supply chains and 
supply domestic markets.
Combining definitions from the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) and academia, Lines et al. (2016) 
suggest that economic informality can be described by 
five core concepts:
• the informal economy – which covers all 
enterprises, workers, and activities operating 
outside of legal regulatory frameworks;
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• the informal sector – which refers to production 
and employment in unregistered businesses;
• informal institutions – socially shared rules 
about how to do business, which fall outside the 
regulatory ambit of the state;
• informal markets – organisational arenas where 
labour, goods or services are traded outside of 
formal frameworks;
• informal employment – which is employment 
outside of labour protection regulations, either in 
formal or informal enterprises.
From the CLARISSA scoping studies, we add one further 
concept to explore economic informality and WFCL in this 
Working Paper:
• informal access to work – through kin 
relationships and labour intermediaries.
1.3 A focus on child labour in its 
worst forms
The ILO’s definition of WFCL sets international 
standards. This definition includes slavery, debt bondage, 
compulsory labour, armed conflict, child prostitution, 
hazardous labour, illicit activities, and any other work 
likely to damage the health, safety, and morals of children 
(Avis 2017). According to the ILO (ILO-IPEC 2013), 
hazardous work by children includes:
• exposure to physical, psychological or sexual 
abuse;
• work underground, underwater, in confined spaces 
or at dangerous heights;
• use of dangerous machinery, equipment or tools, 
or heavy loads;
• use of hazardous substances, temperatures, noise 
levels or vibrations;
• long hours, or night work.
Reviewing the list for the purposes of this Working 
Paper, we interpret that child labour becomes one of the 
worst forms according to the type/sector of work (e.g. 
trading sex), the work activity (e.g. use of dangerous 
equipment, heavy loads), the conditions of the work 
(e.g. long hours, work underground, exposure to abuse), 
and the impact of the work (e.g. damaging health) (see 
Figure 1).
What the ILO definition makes clear is that child labour 
can automatically become WFCL depending on the 
Table 1: Worst forms of child labour in the CLARISSA programme
Worst forms of child labour in the CLARISSA programme
Type of WFCL Conditional WFCL – work 
activities and conditions
Conditional WFCL – work 
conditions
Unconditional and conditional 
WFCL
Location Bangladesh Myanmar Nepal 
Supply chain Leather Fish and waste Human
Work activity Tanning, liming, fleshing, 
dehairing
Dry fish sorting, grading, 
drying fish
Dance bars, restaurants, 
hotels
Dying and drying Fishing among migrant 
workers
Sex work
Cutting of leather and threads Waste-pickers Information technology 
(IT)-based sex work
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sector. The sex industry, illicit industries, and armed 
conflict are recognised as unconditionally bad for children. 
However, the definition also makes clear that it is possible 
for employment in any sector to become WFCL by virtue 
of its precarious nature. In these instances, activities, 
conditions, and health impacts are what determine 
whether child labour becomes a worst form. In these 
instances, WFCL is conditional on the characteristics of 
the work. 
1.4 Research questions
The overarching goals of this Working Paper are to 
identify where we have evidence on supply chains, the 
informal economy, and WFCL in South and Southeast 
Asia and what the evidence says. 
In a review of the literature, I have sought to answer the 
following questions: 
• What supply chain dynamics influence how and 
where WFCL exists within them? 
• How do we identify whether a supply chain is at 
risk of engaging WFCL? 
• What is known about supply chain interventions 
which are effective in reducing WFCL?
I discuss what the literature says about the key dynamics, 
interdependencies, and enablers that organise the 
priorities and behaviours of stakeholders in the informal 
sphere of supply chain systems. I bring together the 
findings in a more detailed theory of change in the 
discussion, and suggest future research opportunities.
4
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2 METHODS
The research informing this Working Paper was a 
desk-based exercise carried out in November 2020.
2.1 Research activities
Research activities comprised the following:
1 Identification and review of key documents 
and reports from the CLARISSA scoping phase, 
including evidence-based reports, theories of 
change, workshop outputs, and supply chain 
mapping documents. 
2 A rapid review of existing literature, including 
Boolean searches of academic studies on JSTOR, 
ScienceDirect and Google Scholar, using the search 
terms ‘child labour’, ‘Asia’, ‘supply chain’, and 
‘informal’. Following a screening of 308 abstracts 
from the JSTOR and ScienceDirect searches, and 
a review of the first five pages of Google Scholar 
searches, 129 articles were identified for abstract 
review. This review process led to the identification 
of circa 60 articles for full review. Sometimes these 
articles referenced other studies and research 
worthy of follow-up.
 To capture evidence from the key organisations, 
alliances, and networks working on WFCL, a rapid 
search of key terms was entered into Google. 
This included data reports by ReliefWeb, a scan 
of UNICEF’s MegaMap on Child Well-being 
Interventions (UNICEF n.d.), and a search of child 
slavery and Asia in the Slavery Research Library 
on The Freedom Fund’s website (The Freedom 
Fund n.d.).
3 Meetings and key interviews to direct the literature 
review from field experience. I joined a number of 
meetings with the CLARISSA programme, and held 
two separate meetings with Mr A K M Maksud and 
Peggy Hermann, who have worked on supply chain 
mapping in the leather sector in Bangladesh. These 
sessions explored and ‘tested’ the relevance of 
emerging research findings to direct thinking. 
2.2 Limitations
This was a rapid review of existing literature. It goes 
broader rather than deep, seeking to identify some of the 
core dynamics of supply chains that cause WFCL, which 
are similar across different supply chains and self-similar 
at different scales within a supply chain system. 
While the author was mindful of the focal areas of the 
CLARISSA programme (the leather sector in Bangladesh, 
the waste and recycling sectors in Myanmar, the fishing 
sector in Myanmar, and the adult entertainment sector 
in Nepal), the papers cited in this review are skewed 
towards understanding the garments and leather sectors 
in Bangladesh, (1) because more has been written about 
them than the other sectors in Nepal and Myanmar; 
and (2) because the focus of this paper is on supply 
chain dynamics, and the leather sector in Bangladesh 
represents an established but highly complex network of 
manufacturing and production. 
In some cases, the arguments may feel under-nuanced 
from the perspective of a particular supply chain context 
(e.g. urban poverty) or set of actors (e.g. girls). While this 
paper is focused on identifying attributes and dynamics 
that are similar across different supply chain contexts, it 
is my view that supply chains are rooted in place – and 
thus all the cultural, historical, and social complexities of 
a locale. They do not float, untethered; they reside in and 
around the neighbourhoods and homes that children grow 
up in. Where this Working Paper stops, conversations 
within the CLARISSA programme continue, especially to 
identify interlinkages with neighbourhood dynamics and 
social norms that explain pathways in and out of WFCL 
within specific contexts.
SUMMARY
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3 WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT 
WFCL AND THE INFORMAL 
ECONOMY
3.1 Unseen instances of WFCL
Much of WFCL in the informal economy remains 
unseen in global and national data sets. In 2018 the ILO 
estimated that 61 per cent of the world’s workers earn 
their living in the informal economy, amounting to 2 billion 
workers worldwide (ILO 2018b). Despite the vastness of 
the informal economy and the central role it plays in the 
livelihoods of billions of households and families, work 
informality is not used as a category for data collection 
and data analysis on WFCL. 
Table 1 (Section 1.1) identified how ILO definitions 
suggest that WFCL can be ‘unconditional’ according 
to the sector (e.g. sex trade) or a specific activity (e.g. 
dancing in an unregulated bar), but it can also be 
‘conditional’ on the work activity, the conditions of work, 
and the impact of the work. These definitional boundaries 
are particularly important when it comes to identifying 
WFCL in the informal economy. Researchers have 
observed that work in the informal economy is often more 
precarious, stressful, and physically impactful than work 
in the formal economy (Benach and Muntaner 2007; 
Muntaner et al. 2010). Some of this work may not present 
as hazardous without a much deeper understanding of 
children’s experience of work (Prentice et al. 2018). 
3.2 The need for spatial and temporal 
analyses
Researchers have found that precarious work is 
unequally distributed across global supply chains (Benach 
and Muntaner 2007). It is more likely to be done by 
women, lower-skilled, and subordinate workers, defined 
by structural social positions such as class, ethnicity, and 
immigrant status (Muntaner et al. 2010) – and, in the case 
of child labour, age.
A review paper looking at work and health inequalities 
highlights a number of studies showing that child 
labourers are exposed to behavioural, psychosocial, and 
physio-pathological pathways leading to physical and 
mental health problems (Muntaner et al. 2010). 
Some of the pathways from work to health are additive, 
so it is not just the fact that children are working, but 
that they experience hazardous working conditions (e.g. 
exposure to chemicals, extreme weather, repetitive work, 
heavy workloads, dangerous equipment) in addition to 
stressful working environments, where they are coerced, 
subject to physical force, restricted in their movement, 
and live in fear (Muntaner et al. 2010). Field data from the 
CLARISSA programme have shown how working in a tea 
shop or fish market – which does not by itself equate to 
sectors or activities that constitute WFCL – becomes child 
labour in its worst forms if children are working long hours 
in a hostile workplace setting without breaks (Constant 
et al. 2020). 
Other studies have shown correlations between child 
labour and long-term development issues (Fassa 
2003), although it is difficult to disentangle the effects 
of child labour from the effects associated with poverty 
(Muntaner et al. 2010). This is because the long-term 
physiological repercussions do not appear in current 
statistics on child labour and they are not captured by 
health-care professionals when an adult presents with a 
health condition (Eijkemans, Fassa and Facchin 2005). 
Very recent research systematically monitoring working 
conditions and health among sugar cane workers found 
that heavy workloads, combined with sun and heat 
exposure over long hours, are related to high rates of 
kidney disease among men in young adulthood (Glaser 
et al. 2020). Ill health forces the next generation of young 
workers into the fields. This emerging evidence has 
direct implications for children working in hot conditions 
stretching and drying skins in the leather supply chain 
and potentially for children working in fishing villages 
in Myanmar. From a conceptual and methodological 
perspective, the Glaser et al. (2020) study illustrates how 
the sector, conditions, activities, and health impacts can 
all interact to make work especially harmful to children. 
Following a review of health and safety in the garments 
sector in Bangladesh, Prentice et al. (2018) argue that 
we need to think temporally and spatially about the health 
and wellbeing of workers. While this study focused on 
adult workers, its recommendations for a more granular 
and experiential exploration of precarious work are 
relevant. Extrapolated to WFCL, the authors argue for:
• a temporal understanding of worker health and 
wellbeing to understand how garment work fits 
into and shapes the prospects of a child’s life 
trajectory;
• a spatial understanding of worker health and 
wellbeing informed by local meanings of 
‘decent work’ and a child’s own experiences and 
interpretations of what threatens their health, and 
what may enhance their wellbeing.
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This is supported by Muntaner et al.’s (2010) argument 
that we cannot understand the demand pattern of 
child labour without constructing detailed spatial and 
temporal analyses. 
New methodologies are being developed to increase 
the sophistication of data systems to identify issues in 
supply chains. Within supply chain management, the 
legal concept of ‘chain of custody’ is being used to trace 
the provenance of the products we buy (ISEAL Alliance 
2016). It creates a chronological documentation of all 
the people who have come into contact with an item, 
including when and where. Similarly, academics have 
designed a methodology to trace accidents and deaths 
associated with specific products (Alsamawi et al. 
2017). However, neither methodology has been applied 
to tracing incidences of WFCL in global value chains, 
especially as they extend into the informal economy.
15Working Paper 8
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4 MAKING SENSE OF SUPPLY 
CHAIN SYSTEMS
Supply chain systems have evolved into complex, 
multi-scale networks of producers, suppliers, and buyers, 
which span formal and informal economies (ILO et al. 
2019). Even within smaller supply chain systems where 
children are the commodity, the human chains can be 
highly complex, characterised by diverse networks of 
family, friends, business owners, intermediaries, brokers, 
money-lenders, and local power-holders.
Arguably, this increased complexity has made supply 
chains invisible to the individual actors who play critical 
roles within the system. Large global brands struggle for 
control over production in the more remote tiers of their 
supply chains (Quak 2020), especially when it comes to 
monitoring working conditions (Alsamawi et al. 2017). 
And the child in work has little influence over their work 
conditions, even though as a cohort of people ‘children 
in work’ have unwittingly become critical to the everyday 
functioning of supply chain systems. The effect is that 
people are powerless because they are unable to ‘see’ 
the dynamics of the system that structure their choices 
and their points of influence.
This section explores what we can learn about how 
supply chain systems function and interact with formal 
and informal economies to improve our understanding 
of WFCL.
4.1 Two distinct organising logics
A review of the literature reveals that formal and informal 
economies have different organising logics. This means 
that the tangible and intangible elements of supply 
chains – like places of work and attitudes to work – are 
negotiated by different rules and governance systems, 
depending on whether a business activity takes place in 
the formal or informal economy. 
Table 2 compares the organising logics of formal and 
informal economies within supply chain systems. Lead 
firms operate in the formal economy, using international 
standards, partnership agreements, legally binding 
contracts, and formal rules of engagement to influence 
the behaviour of suppliers (Nadvi 2008; Soundararanjan 
and Brown 2016).
Table 2: Comparing the organising logics of formal and informal economies within supply 
chain systems
Formal sphere Informal sphere
Communication in written agreements Face-to-face communication
Professional relationships Personal relationships
Institutional trust Personal trust
Legally binding contracts Verbal agreements
Loans from banks Credit from friends and money-lenders
Vertical dependencies Mutual dependencies
Global standards Locally defined norms
Source: Author’s own.
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By contrast, the organising logic of the informal economy 
is entirely different (Prentice et al. 2018; Soundararanjan 
and Brown 2016). It is an area of supply chain systems 
typically negotiated by face-to-face communication, 
socially defined norms, horizontal relations (e.g. family or 
friends), mutual dependencies, and personal trust (Etzold 
et al. 2009). Extensions of credit run through these value 
chains, creating mutual dependencies and coordinating 
activities (see Section 5.3). To complicate the picture, 
ownership of small businesses can be diluted across 
many individuals, as in the adult entertainment sector 
in Nepal.
Trust is important for business across a supply chain 
system, but it is more personal in the informal economy, 
affected by relational attributes and connections 
between small and unregistered businesses. Trust in 
social networks can determine who gets to do business 
and who gets to work. For example, systemic trust 
tethered to the cultural festival Eid-ul-Azha reduces 
power asymmetries in market entry in the leather 
sector, resulting in an increase of leather intermediaries 
brokering trade between businesses (Strasser 2015). In 
its scoping studies, the CLARISSA programme has found 
that employers hire children through extended kinship 
networks, including through parents, neighbours, and 
peer networks (Constant et al. 2020). Often, the decision 
to engage children is about helping out extended family 
by finding employment for a child who has migrated to the 
city from the village. 
The informality with which people access work in the 
informal economy has much in common with research 
on social capital and social networks in the formal 
economy. This shows that who we are connected to can 
structure the opportunities available to us (Putnam 2000; 
Woolcock 2001; Halpern 2009). Social network analyses 
also suggest that social networks act as containers of 
customs and social norms, which determine how people 
relate to and behave with one another. They function as 
a basis for shared identity and sources of support and 
advice (Gilchrist 2000, 2001; Gilchrist and Kyprianou 
2011; Morris and Gilchrist 2012). Given the power of 
‘social proof’ to validate behaviour in social networks 
(Cialdini 2003, 2009), the sorts of advice and support 
exchanged between actors may affect the extent to which 
WFCL becomes normalised within communities and 
neighbourhoods.
Ultimately, this means that two distinct governance 
regimes interact to shape use of children as pivotal actors 
in supply chain systems (Nadvi 2008). To paraphrase 
Soundararanjan and Brown (2016), the attentional, 
cognitive, emotional, and motivational drivers of 
behaviour are not homogenously experienced by buyers, 
suppliers, subcontractors, and micro-entrepreneurs alike. 
In particular, the organising logic of the informal economy 
places greater emphasis on the role of social networks 
and relational systems for understanding how and where 
WFCL show up in supply chains. 
4.2 Important interdependencies 
In research and policy, the informal and formal economies 
are typically presented as two independent systems, with 
businesses ‘upgrading’ and workers ‘graduating’ from one 
to the other. For example, the involvement of economies 
in supply chain systems is presented as ‘a necessary 
step for transitioning economies’ (Amin 2016) and, to the 
individual workers, ‘a liberating experience and pathway 
to social mobility’ (Prentice et al. 2018). As Prentice 
et al. (2018) are astute to point out, these geo-political 
narratives are neither accurate nor liberating. 
In reality, formal economies depend on informal economic 
activity (Marx 2018). They interact as ‘open’ systems 
where behaviour in one part of the supply chain system 
(e.g. a lead firm) affects behaviour in another part (e.g. a 
micro-entrepreneur) and vice versa. This literature review 
explored these interdependencies from the perspective of 
WFCL. It reveals how the formal economy has an indirect 
role in creating opportunities for child labour in supply 
chain systems through stigma, intentional informalisation, 
and proximity. 
Workers in the sex trade are typically working in 
unsafe environments in the informal economy because 
the trade of sex is not sanctioned socially or legally, 
despite considerable consumer demand (Jana et al. 
2014). Waste-pickers are part of the informal economy 
because their work is stigmatised by society (WIEGO 
2020), and their contribution to waste management 
in neighbourhoods is not integrated into supply chain 
management (Holm 2020). For example, solid waste 
management within leather tanneries in Bangladesh has 
been intentionally informalised, resulting in the use of 
practices harmful to public health (Strasser 2015).
Operating outside the spotlight of regulations and 
standards, labour in the informal economy is cheaper 
to pay for, but it is also more precarious, stressful, and 
physically impactful than work in the formal economy 
(Benach and Muntaner 2007; Muntaner et al. 2010). 
Studies have shown how employment in the informal 
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economy – including the labour-intensive garment work 
in factories, workshops, and homes – depletes working 
bodies with long-term repercussions (Prentice et al. 
2018). It is not easy for children engaged in WFCL to 
ascend to work in the formal sector as they grow older 
(Basu and Tzannatos 2003), suggesting that entry into 
WFCL exacerbates poverty and reduces social mobility 
(ILO et al. 2019). As an illustration, the CLARISSA 
scoping research found that in the adult entertainment 
sector (AES) in Nepal:
Most of the minors working in AES do not have 
adequate skills and other experience so they are 
left with no other options than to continue working 
in AES. They start their work from AES, get trapped 
and rarely get other employment opportunities. 
(Lamsel, Sharma and Bhujel 2020: 13) 
Decisions about how to do business in the formal 
economy directly increase vulnerabilities. A recent review 
of modern slavery in supply chains found that forests, 
reefs, coastal environments, and protected areas are 
destroyed by people labouring informally. The depletion 
of natural environments then increases the level of 
vulnerability within enslaved communities to further 
precarious work (Gold, Trautrims and Trodd 2015).
In some cases, it is the proximity of the informal economy 
to the formal economy that may itself be a driver of 
WFCL. For example, the CLARISSA programme is 
learning that within the adult entertainment sector in 
Kathmandu, children move in and out of legal and illegal 
work. This means that children’s pathways into WFCL are 
non-linear and highly diverse. There can be movement 
in and out of employment in the formal and the informal 
economies, and sometimes children work concurrently in 
both. For example, children may work in dance bars and 
casinos, which are part of the formal regulated sector, 
but within the same building or very close by there is an 
opportunity to trade sex. 
Similarly, the CLARISSA programme is finding that the 
formal and informal economies are also closely bound 
together in the leather sector in Bangladesh. One factory 
may operate within the formal economy to engage with 
domestic and international buyers, but also employ 
children in the informal economy to meet their contractual 
obligations to suppliers in the formal economy. The use of 
children in the informal economy through subcontracting 
is not limited to ‘upstream’ industries (e.g. growing 
crops, cattle-rearing); it also intersects with ‘downstream’ 
suppliers and processors close to final production. For 
example, CLARISSA’s work mapping the leather supply 
chain identified 107 processing steps, 103 of which 
involving children in the manufacture of leather gloves, 
shoes, moneybags, jackets and belts (see Tables 2, 3, 
4, 5 and 6 in Moktadir and Bashar 2021). Researchers 
observed that children’s involvement was spread across 
the supply chain, rather than being clustered around 
specific supply chain activities. WFCL were found in 
mechanical processes (e.g. cattle-rearing, drying, selling, 
slaughtering, bone-crushing, transporting crust leather), 
chemical processes (e.g. washing of raw skin hide, 
preserving skin hides), and supporting processes (e.g. 
transporting and trading wet blue leather).
Often, it is the same people organising work in both 
economies (Strasser 2015). The places of work – e.g. 
a leather processing factory or dance club – can also 
overlap. In these cases, the proximity of the formal to the 
informal makes it relatively easy for children to access 
more precarious work. 
Figure 2 depicts formal and informal economies as open, 
interacting systems in the production of WFCL. It is a 
graphical representation of the literature just mentioned to 
emphasise the point that WFCL is not solely an informal 
economy issue, even if this is where it is most frequently 
found in supply chain systems. In fact, decisions in 
the formal sector are directly implicated. Figure 2 
hypothesises that the decision taken by a business or 
a household to engage with WFCL is the result of a 
series of interacting forces residing in the formal and the 
informal economies, which all serve to narrow choices.
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For example, decisions about what is desirable in 
the formal economy (e.g. consumer choice) are often 
dependent on the capabilities of the informal economy 
(e.g. adaptation of processing techniques to meet 
demand) and vice versa. The dynamics influencing actors 
in the informal economy (e.g. poverty, low economic 
resilience) are reinforced by ways of doing business and 
approaching issues like WFCL in the formal economy 
(e.g. cost-driven procurement, the use of universal 
standards), just as the dynamics influencing the shape 
of work in the informal economy have roots in growing 
inequalities and lack of access to jobs in the formal 
economy (Muntaner et al. 2010). Interdependencies 
between formal and informal economies are important 
dynamics producing and reproducing WFCL in supply 
chain systems, which need to be understood more deeply 
if we are to reduce use of children.






Poverty & low economic resilience
Lack of access to jobs in formal economy
Agility and rapid adaptation
Source: Author’s own. 
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5 STRATEGIES AND 
BEHAVIOURS IN SUPPLY 
CHAIN SYSTEMS
This section looks at the everyday functioning of supply 
chain systems, exploring how business gets done. The 
literature review identified four strategies and behaviours 
which make it easier for WFCL to be used in supply 
chain systems: the transfer of risk; the practice of 
subcontracting; the extension of credit; and rapid rates of 
adaptation in the informal sector.
5.1 The transfer of risk
In 1985, Michael Porter introduced the idea of a value 
chain with his best-seller, Competitive Advantage: 
Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance. The 
book identified the human resources (HR), procurement, 
technological development, and infrastructure activities 
that organisations could leverage to minimise risk and 
drive competitive advantage in their supply chains. 
Following this evolution of thought, it was no longer 
competitive for a business to have a supply chain; a 
company had to find a way to add value to raw materials 
as those raw materials progressed through production, 
manufacturing, and related processes into a finished 
product (Horner and Nadvi 2017).
As the economy became more globalised, trade more 
polycentric, and supply chains more layered (ibid.), 
the concept of the global value chain was developed 
to coordinate inter-regional actions and relationships 
across producers, middlemen, suppliers, and lead 
firms. In search for value added, extractive business 
practices in supply chains have become commonplace. 
It is considered both acceptable – and desirable – to 
outsource negative impacts on human wellbeing and 
environmental wellbeing to other people and geographies. 
As Martin Rich (2020: 22) puts it, in The Business of 
Wellbeing: ‘The more you outsource externalities, the 
better you do financially in today’s system. If companies 
outsource all harm you never have to account/pay for it.’ 
In all this outsourcing, supply chains have become a 
conduit for transferring risk from one business to another 
(Quak 2020). As global value chains establish linkages 
with hubs of source materials and manufacturing 
processes, risk is transferred into local economies 
through increasingly complex, diverse, dynamic, and 
evolving supply chains (Koberg and Longoni 2019). 
Through the manufacture of products for larger suppliers 
and enterprises and through the recycling of waste 
materials (WIEGO 2015; Egels-Zanden and Merk 
2014; Horner and Nadvi 2017), small business entities 
become part of much larger supply chain systems. 
As such, micro-businesses, single households, family 
networks, and children can become key actors in supply 
chain systems.
Table 3 summarises what the literature says about 
the key pressures facing micro and small enterprises 
interacting with global value chains and their strategies 
for managing the risk (Strasser 2015; Egels-Zanden and 
Merk 2014; Lamsel et al. 2020). It shows how small-scale 
entrepreneurs are dealing with squeezed price points, 
long payment periods, and volatile order sizes (Strasser 
2015). Small-scale entrepreneurs often live on the edge 
of poverty. They are often independent actors with limited 
access to safe credit, who have little bargaining power 
about the sorts of contracts they accept (Egels-Zanden 
and Merk 2014). And because the work they do is 
low-skilled, competition to win work is high, increasing the 
pressure people are under to take whatever work they 
can get, even if contractual demands are unreasonable.
An interesting observation in the literature is that market 
expansion does not transmit greater security along the 
supply chain. As the fishing trade has grown in South 
Asia, researchers have documented how businesses 
have reduced operating costs by enlisting children 
(Chantavanich, Laodumrongchai and Stringer 2015). 
A survey of 595 deckhands in 2012 from Thailand, 
Cambodia, and Myanmar working in four coastal 
provinces in Thailand found that 33 of those surveyed 
were aged 17 or younger, and 7 of those were younger 
than 15 years of age (Chantavanich et al. 2015). The 
majority were from Myanmar and just over two-thirds 
reported working somewhere between 17 and 24 hours a 
day. So, as demand at the consumer end of global value 
chains increases, working conditions do not necessarily 
improve. The trend can be the other way: the more 
markets expand, the greater the risk they transmit into 
local economies.
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Risk management strategy employed 
Low price points Drive costs down by subcontracting/outsourcing
Long payment periods Reduce/minimise costs as much as possible, including by subcontracting and 
adapting processes
Volatile order sizes Link to a local lead firm to stabilise demand
Subcontract piecemeal labour to peers and less-skilled manufacturers, 
including children
Limited access to safe credit Establish lines of credit
Access business loans (sometimes via brokers)
Low capacity and skill Prioritise risky but capital-providing transactions, including use of new processes
Poverty-related stress Coerce workers to work for longer 
Access household credit/loans 
Source: Author’s own. 
5.2 The practice of subcontracting
Subcontracting is the process by which a business 
outsources manufacturing, processing or servicing. It is 
commonplace in supply chain management practice, but 
under-explored in research on WFCL. 
Table 3 (in Section 5.1) highlighted how small-scale 
entrepreneurs often subcontract to deal with low-cost 
margins and volatility in order sizes. The practice of 
subcontracting is widely assumed to increase the use of 
WFCL in supply chains, because auditors do not reach 
all the informal places of work in their assessments. The 
practice also protects small-scale entrepreneurs from 
the pressures of global buyers and standard-setting 
organisations (Strasser 2015).
The scoping phase of CLARISSA has reported that lead 
international firms in the leather and garments value 
chains threaten to move supply to other countries if local 
manufacturers cannot meet the price point (Maksud pers. 
comm. 2020). Suppliers do not want to lose contracts, 
so they take the order. For example, a domestic supplier 
may take an order for 5 million trousers, even though 
the government-registered and monitored factory can 
only make 1 million within the allotted time frame. The 
domestic supplier will then subcontract the remaining 
4 million trousers to micro and small entrepreneurs 
working in unregulated workplaces. In interviews with 
lead domestic suppliers in the leather supply chain in 
Bangladesh, domestic suppliers have explained that 
they cannot terminate contracts with domestic suppliers 
using WFCL because only 6 per cent of their production 
is in-house (Strasser 2015). To terminate contracts with 
producers employing children would expose the business 
to too much risk because it would mean that they would 
not be able to meet the suppliers’ order requirements. 
The practice of subcontracting also introduces space 
for intermediaries to assume ‘knowledge roles’ in supply 
chains. For example, Strasser (2015) found that business 
entities known as ‘buying houses’ or ‘buying agents’ who 
procure locally to sell into export markets may prevent 
small-scale entrepreneurs from exchanging information 
with foreign buyers, so each party effectively remains 
captive to the intermediary. 
When researchers mapped the information flows between 
buyers, suppliers, and manufacturers in a supply chain for 
making upper leather for shoes, they depicted information 
flowing one way from international or local buyers to the 
manufacturer, who then sent information to chemical 
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suppliers, wholesalers, and raw hides suppliers (Moktadir 
and Bashar forthcoming). There are no direct information 
flows between buyers and processors and manufacturers 
subcontracted by the lead manufacturing firm. 
Intermediaries, and the lack of information flowing 
around a supply chain system, are consequences of 
subcontracting, but are also important mechanisms for 
obscuring and perpetuating the use of WFCL between 
businesses and between buyers and suppliers.
5.3 The extension of credit
Ethnographic studies of trade in the informal economy 
have highlighted the role of credit and debt in enabling 
business to take place. With limited access to safe 
credit (e.g. loans from banks), micro-entrepreneurs and 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) establish 
lines of credit to enable trade to happen (see Table 3, 
Section 5.1). These loans are not without risk and the 
associated stress that accompanies living and trading 
by them. 
Haugen (2017: 321–2) calls supply chains structured by 
lines of credit ‘beholden value chains’, explaining that:
A strong sense of vulnerability prevails among 
manufacturers, suppliers and traders, and is 
increased by the lack of enforceable quality 
standards and volatile macro-economic 
environments.
Credit lines enable a business transaction, but in so 
doing, they transmit risk across product stages and 
geographical space. In her ethnographic study of 
jewellery supply chains between China and Ghana, 
Haugen (2017) found that at any one time, all actors in 
the supply chain can be owed money. The sequence 
of credit begins with Ghanaian traders asking Chinese 
suppliers to defer payments until the traders have resold 
some of the goods they order. The suppliers defer 
payments to manufacturers, who delay salaries to people 
working in the factories. In other supply chain systems, it 
is intermediaries who facilitate market transactions with 
credit. Research mapping beef, sheep, and goat food 
systems in Nairobi found that cattle transactions are often 
mediated by brokers, who purchase animals on credit and 
sell them at a higher price (Alarcon et al. 2016). 
In general terms, it seems that credit is preferable to 
loans because interest rates are not applied. Extensions 
of credit are promises of payment, which are delayed 
a matter of hours or days to bridge the timing of future 
income (Constant et al. 2020). This highly personal and 
relational way of doing business is not so commonplace 
among business-to-business transactions in the formal 
economy (Battersby, Marshak and Mngqibisa 2016). 
But credit can switch to debt in cases where individuals, 
households or businesses cannot make payments (ibid.).
CLARISSA researchers have mapped the typical pathway 
for a young woman from COVID-triggered lockdown 
to the decision to get work in the AES in Nepal (see 
Figure 3). Running through this narrative is the limited 
savings and credit options available to self-employed 
people in the informal economy. When savings get 
depleted or access to safe credit is exhausted, individuals 
are forced to try out more risky options. This pattern may 
be particularly pronounced in sectors that use indebted 
labour like fishing in rural communities (Molland 2019). 
In Myanmar, interviewees of the CLARISSA programme 
declared that ‘all families have debts’ and the existence of 
debt in conjunction with an emergency – such as a death, 
injury or ill health in the family – co-existed with WFCL 
(Constant et al. 2020). Other research has found that 
parents pledge themselves or their children against loans 
for undefined lengths of time when they cannot pay back 
loans. These arrangements can be difficult to identify in 
supply chain systems because they get masked under 
familiar business mechanisms like loans and contracts 
(Gold et al. 2015). 
5.4 Rapid rates of adaptation in the 
informal sector
‘Autonomous adaptation’ is a term that has been applied 
to the informal economy to describe local action by 
individuals, households, groups, and enterprises in 
response to constraints and opportunities they face 
(Seballos n.d). Business practices in the informal 
economy can be habitual (e.g. the way things have 
always been done to short-cut transaction costs) but 
they can also be spontaneous responses to the labour 
demands that global supply chains create (Etzold et al. 
2009). 
Within the adult entertainment sector in Nepal, the 
increasing demand for the engagement of children in 
sexual services has been related to a growing urban 
population engaging in a more consumer-based economy 
(Lamsal et al. 2020). During the COVID-19 lockdowns, 
venues in the sector closed, but services soon resumed 
virtually through IT-based sex work. In Bangladesh, 
supply chain analysis is revealing four or five locally 
adapted methods for every stage of leather processing. 
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Sometimes it is a lack of technical capacity to respond to 
international conditions that necessitates more informal 
arrangements for staying cost-effective (von Hagen and 
Alvarez 2012). 
Taking an asset-based view of the informal economy, we 
can see that in many significant ways it is more diverse 
and flexible than the formal economy. It is entrepreneurial 
in nature, and it does not have hoops to jump through to 
pivot and re-think strategy. It relies on tacit knowledge 
transfer, fuelled by people’s energy and commitments 
to one another, unsupported by industry standards and 
legal requirements. This is not to overlook how difficult it 
is to work in the informal economy, but it recognises the 
incredible resilience and ingenuity that exists within and 
between the 2 billion workers who earn a living by it.
Figure 3: Mapping a typical pathway of a young woman into the adult entertainment sector (AES) as a result of the 
COVID-19 pandemic  
Source: © Malla (2020). 
Finally, she is forced to 
accept risky options in the 
AES, leading to unwanted 
pregnancy/diseases, 
harassment/blackmailing 
and ending in human 
trafficking – modern slavery 
and suicidal attempts
March 2020 –  
nationwide 
lockdown




She could not send 
money to her family 
due to crisis
She couldn’t get 
financial support 
from friends or 
manager – as they 
are also struggling
She can’t afford to 
purchase food or 
pay rent or acquire 
the relief supplies 
because of her 
connection to AES
After a few weeks 
– her savings 
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6 EMERGENCIES, SUPPLY 
CHAINS, AND RESILIENCE
During the research for this Working Paper, the world 
was living through COVID-19, which caused large-scale 
disruption of supply chain systems and job losses. 
The ILO has estimated that 195 million jobs globally 
will cease to exist as a result of the pandemic (Clarke 
2020). COVID-19 has affected business and consumer 
demand for products, and fluctuations in demand are 
transferred into reduced production in supplier networks. 
As Susan Lund, partner at McKinsey Global Institute, 
recently reflected:
We’ve spent 25 years creating these incredibly 
complicated, complex global supply chains. And 
they were designed for cost and efficiency, but 
without really a thought to what could go wrong 
along the way.  
(Lund 2020)
As a result of COVID-19, lead firms are investing in 
supply chain recovery and economists are thinking 
more proactively about supply chain risk and resilience 
in a post-COVID world. With the combination of trade 
tensions, natural disasters, cyberattacks, and health 
pandemics, industry experts predict that lead firms 
in supply chains will expect to see disruption to their 
production lines for 1–2 months every 3–4 years (ibid.).
The ramifications of COVID-19 on supply chain systems 
are yet to be properly researched, but shocks of this kind 
are likely to have implications for WFCL. Initial research 
seems to point to a concurrent increase in pressure within 
households and within business units. At the household 
level, researchers are reporting a 30 per cent increase in 
domestic violence since the COVID-19 outbreak (Meester 
and Ooijens 2020). Within business units, CLARISSA’s 
situational analysis in Nepal is reporting that owners of 
AES establishments are suffering from stress and anxiety 
(Lamsel et al. 2020). News reports suggest that exports 
of leather goods declined by 22 per cent in Bangladesh. 
As a result, tanneries closed and businesses targeted 
children as cheap labour (Afroze 2020). 
A 2016 review by the Child Protection Working Group 
raised concerns that we do not know enough about 
how emergencies act as triggers that push supply chain 
systems and households towards WFCL. For example, 
flooding in Cambodia and a tsunami in Sri Lanka did not 
have a significant impact on WFCL, whereas recurrent 
emergencies and economic shocks have resulted in use 
of WFCL in other cases (Enyon 2018). These findings 
suggest that the effects of emergencies are context-
specific and path-dependent. Enyon (2018) emphasises 
the importance of understanding the process of living 
through an extreme event, writing that ‘there is little 
information available on responses during different 
phases of an emergency’ (ibid.: 16). 
The psychological literature suggests that emergencies 
affect an individual’s physiology (e.g. the surge of 
adrenaline and cortisol) and decision-making. The sphere 
of our concern narrows around the immediate threat and 
we adopt a simpler mode of information processing to 
help focus on the critical issues (Steiner, Nussbaumer 
and Albert n.d.; Kowalski-Trakofler, Vaught and Scharf 
2003). The more stressed and fatigued we become, the 
poorer the decisions we make. We are unable to restore 
balance and instead we lose our capacity to restore and 
remain resilient (Mariotti 2015). 
Within communities, emergencies also trigger different 
behaviour. Social support is thought to moderate the 
impacts of vulnerability by conferring resilience to stress 
(Ozbay et al. 2007). In socio-ecological terms, social 
safety nets help us to sustain and reform the capacities to 
absorb, anticipate, and adapt to disasters (Haworth et al. 
2016). However, it is possible that when an emergency 
becomes chronic or when the scale of an emergency is 
so large as to reduce the economic resilience of every 
household in a community, a different set of common 
belief systems about survival and support are triggered. 
What is considered an acceptable strategy within a 
household or business unit may shift as actors are 
exposed to different levels of risk.
Resilience analysis and measurement has recently 
become interested in the existence of thresholds, and 
the influence of crossing thresholds for systems shift 
(Resilience Alliance and Santa Fe Institute 2004). Applied 
to the issue of WFCL, a resilience threshold would be 
conceptualised as a line which, once people are living 
over it, means they are much less likely to resort to WFCL 
in the future. Resilience thresholds have been used to 
take a multidimensional approach to identifying escape 
from poverty (Scott, Hillier and Underhill 2014) alongside 
resilience to shocks and stressors (d’Errico et al. 2019). 
In these examples, economists are seeking to identify 
critical resilience thresholds below which households are 
unable to absorb negative effects of a changing climate. 
While a conversation about risk and resilience is 
happening among lead firms and their consultants in 
the formal economy, this review could not find many 
examples of work underway to support small-scale 
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entrepreneurs to forecast future supply chain shocks 
and opportunities. Take, as one example, the growing 
momentum around circular economy approaches to 
assist countries – and large corporate entities – to meet 
requirements under the Paris Agreement protocols. 
A circular economy approach will radically transform the 
way we do business in supply chain systems globally and 
locally (Fletcher and Tham 2019; World Economic Forum 
2014). Within the leather sector, lead firms know that 
more than 90 per cent of their ecological problem exists 
in their supply chains. As a response, they are forecasting 
widespread technological innovation that will perfect 
leathers made from vegetables and food waste streams 
(Goldsworthy, Earley and Politowicz 2019). Tanneries as 
they currently exist in Bangladesh will become obsolete 
(Outrage and Optimism 2020), at least for the export 
market. The risk is that the supply chain system is 
overhauled to meet environmental imperatives, without 
considering the lived experiences of adults and children 
working in the informal economy. 
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7 REDUCING THE WORST 
FORMS OF CHILD LABOUR IN 
THE INFORMAL ECONOMY
CLARISSA’s current theory of change communicates the 
intention to focus on collaborative action between parents 
and guardians, children, supply chain stakeholders, and 
national and local stakeholders (Apgar and Snijder 2020). 
Some of the action research inquiries will be grounded in 
neighbourhoods and some will work with and in supply 
chains. The aim of country-specific engagement plans 
is to decrease the number of children in WFCL. This 
section will link this starting theory of change to existing 
approaches to eradicating WFCL, exploring what can be 
learnt about sensitive intervention points for change. 
7.1 Standards and compliance 
approaches vs locally derived 
solutions
There is a creative tension in the literature about the 
relative value of universal standards and locally derived 
solutions for tackling complex supply chain issues such 
as WFCL. Evidence does not suggest that standards and 
compliance approaches are effective at shifting business 
practices in the informal economy. For example, we know 
very little about how standards impact actors – especially 
workers, but also small-scale entrepreneurs – further 
down the supply chain (Nadvi 2008). And this knowledge 
gap is significant given that target 8 of the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) calls for an end to child 
labour in all its forms by 2025, including small enterprises 
and family businesses (ILO 2018a). 
In his study of the leather sector in Bangladesh, Strasser 
(2015) found that a social enterprise adopted different 
standards for its foreign customers compared to its 
domestic ones. They subjected export producers to more 
monitoring against the Fairtrade standards and ignored 
their responsibility under this standard to empower poor 
domestic producers. The CLARISSA scoping studies 
identified that there are approximately 700 inspectors 
for 7 million economic establishments in the leather 
sector in Bangladesh, which equates to 1 inspector for 
every 10,000 businesses. Labour inspectorate funding in 
Nepal was $6,000 in 2016 and $4,000 in 2017 (Refworld 
2017). This quantitative lens illustrates the challenges 
facing standards and compliance approaches in 
effecting change.
Within the sugar cane industry, the non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) La Isla Network has worked with 
the San Ingenio rum factory in Nicaragua for over a 
decade. They have found that change is very hard to 
come by using auditors (Glaser pers. comm. 2020) 
because – as other studies have found – they rarely act 
independently of their sponsor’s interests and audits are 
rarely unannounced (Crane et al. 2019). Even when the 
factory is alerted to cases of WFCL, the fines issued to 
recruiters did not fundamentally change behaviour. To 
limit the extent to which children are hidden in chains of 
subcontractors, the factory has moved to a model where 
it has a direct contract with every sugar-cane grower. 
This has shortened the supply chain, removed a role 
for intermediaries, and reversed informalisation of the 
supply side.
The power of lead firms to organise and structure value 
chains has been a core assumption in global value 
chain approaches, but it ignores the variety of network 
forms that govern how knowledge is transferred and 
how decisions are made (Nadvi 2008; Horner and 
Nadvi 2017). As explored in Section 4, the informal 
economy has a different governing logic to the formal 
economy. Where legally binding, written agreements 
between parties define the way businesses interact in 
the formal economy, the use of international standards 
– abstracted from people and context – makes sense. 
International standards culturally ‘fit’ the legal and 
financial frameworks that organisations in the formal 
economy use to do business together. However, in the 
informal economy, formality is subservient to the relational 
and the particularities of local context. The implication is 
that approaches that work to enable change in the formal 
economy may be limited in their scope to galvanise 
energy and collective action in the informal economy. 
In 2006, Nike eventually pulled its production from the 
football supply chain in Sialkot, Pakistan, following a 
decade-long multi-stakeholder programme of intervention 
on child labour. One reason cited for the lack of an 
effective form of governance was the failure of global 
actors and local producers to take ownership of the child 
labour standards agenda (Nadvi 2008). Efforts to shift 
the traditional organisation of Shea traders in Burkina 
Faso towards direct sourcing to meet international 
standards have found the complex hierarchical structure 
of intermediaries difficult to change over time (Venturini 
et al. 2016). In a similar vein, a study of informal sector 
recycling in developing and transition countries suggests 
that the integration of informal waste recycling practices 
into formal waste management systems cannot be based 
on a ‘universal’ model; local context and conditions need 
to be considered (Ezeah, Fazakerley and Roberts 2013). 
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Meta studies of factory audits suggest that ‘health and 
safety’ is one area where codes and monitoring have 
made a measurable difference to people’s working lives, 
but ethnographers who have worked in the garment 
industry across South Asia for many years argue that 
regulations fail to take account of the full spectrum of 
pressures that come from working under globalised 
production regimes (Prentice et al. 2018). For example, 
fast fashion requires that workers labour for long hours 
at a fast pace, while low wages mean that workers 
struggle to buy nutritious food for themselves and their 
families. International standards may be more effective 
when considered as part of more systemic approaches 
to tackling child labour, including tackling some of the 
root causes of poor working conditions (Locke, Qin and 
Brause 2006) and wider economic forces within the 
global economy. 
7.2 Working with business units and 
entrepreneurs
The CLARISSA programme’s evidence-mapping in 
Myanmar found few examples of industry interventions to 
prevent WFCL focused on the supply chain (Yunus 2020), 
which was also the case for this literature review. 
In particular, the review was interested to find examples 
of interventions seeking to make adjustments to the 
business context and wider socioeconomic environment 
that push supply chains towards sensitive regions for 
WFCL. This might look like a systems-level intervention 
where new socioeconomic architectures are built around 
small-scale entrepreneurs so that the pressures and 
shocks that supply chain systems present are minimised. 
Or it might look like a supply chain-level intervention to 
strengthen economic resilience to supply chain triggers 
of WFCL. 
The Green Economy Coalition (Mohamed 2020) is one 
organisation proactively looking at how small enterprises 
operating in the informal economy can get a stake 
in the transition. Through a dialogues programme in 
seven countries, the Coalition is looking to co-create a 
new financial and policy architecture around small and 
informal enterprises, which supports self-organisation, 
looks at financing of small businesses, and strengthens 
capacities to adapt. 
From his experience coaching entrepreneurs to move 
away from use of WFCL, Chris Pienaar recommends 
working across the supply chain to effect change within 
it (Pienaar pers. comm. 2020). So, within a given supply 
chain, identify those players who are passionate about 
eradicating WFCL and take one lead international or 
domestic buyer, a couple of medium-sized players (e.g. 
lead supplier and manufacturer), and four or five micro-
entrepreneurs. An action-research process then begins 
to explore what favourable business environments would 
look like for all actors to thrive in their engagement with 
global supply chains, without relying on WFCL.
Interventions that focus on specific workplaces and 
workers’ conditions tend to take place with adults, not 
children. For example, interventions to improve relations 
between employee and employer have ameliorated the 
effects of precarious work (Benach and Muntaner 2007), 
but the ethics and implications of applying this approach 
to child labour have not been explored. This perhaps 
reflects the difficult normative terrain that surrounds child 
labour. Difficulties notwithstanding, children in precarious 
work comprise a significant cohort of actors in supply 
chain systems, yet they have no collective voice and no 
representation. 
7.3 Area-based approaches
In Section 3, the literature suggested the importance of 
understanding the spatial dimensions of WFCL in order to 
understand the dynamics influencing its use. Area-based 
approaches are considered good practice in tackling 
WFCL (ILO 2018a; Ribhu and Pearson 2008) because 
they are thought to:
• go beyond the supply chain to address all the 
push and pull factors driving WFCL within a given 
geographical area;
• prevent children moving from one supply chain 
to another, or slipping into more hidden forms of 
child labour, which correlate with a worsening of 
work conditions and poorer life outcomes (e.g. 
health);
• engage and coordinate the multiple stakeholders 
directly implicated in and affected by WFCL, 
including government officials, industry bodies, 
international buyers, domestic brands, employers, 
recruiters, traffickers, worker organisations, 
children, parents, and civil society.
Early evidence from the CLARISSA programme seems 
to show that children move between supply chains in an 
effort to find work – but that available work options are 
structured by the neighbourhoods they live in. An obvious 
risk of area-based approaches is that the supply chain 
– or the most problematic aspects within them – moves 
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location; in that case, the effect is displacement rather 
than overall reduction of WFCL. 
The strongest place-based initiative found by this review 
was community-run. Over a 10-year period (1992–2011), 
numbers of sexually exploited children reduced from 
25 per cent to 2 per cent in India’s Sonagachi red-
light district (Jana et al. 2014). The median age of 
sex workers also increased from 22 to 28 years. The 
programme combined implementation of self-regulatory 
boards and community vigilance with microcredit and 
educational programmes for children of sex workers. The 
community-based organisation represented more than 
65,000 workers distributed over 49 branch committees 
covering an estimated 85 per cent of sex workers in 
West Bengal. The systematic screening of newcomers 
into the red-light area was far more effective than police 
identification, and the timely case management allowed 
the community-based initiative to distinguish between 
children, unwilling adults, and willing adults. Connection 
with services allowed a person’s age to be identified 
where it was disputed. The use of routine screening is 
based on learnt experience from the domestic violence 
movement: it removes the stigma associated with trading 
sex and creates safe spaces for children to access 
support when they are ready to.
From a business perspective, it is interesting to note that 
these screening initiatives are not about removing the sex 
trade altogether; they are about reducing the number of 
children and unwilling adults involved within the supply 
chain. In this instance, there was less direct engagement 
with business owners of establishments promoting the 
trade of sex and more of a focus on creating a structure 
and a process that allows sex workers to make the district 
child-safe.
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Figure 4: A systems map of the pull factors, push factors, and enabling factors of the worst forms of child labour in supply 
chain systems
8 DISCUSSION
This Working Paper has pieced together fragmented 
evidence from supply chain systems that enable the 
manufacture of products, the management of waste, 
and the trade of human beings in Asia. It shows that 
however complex supply chain systems have become, 
the occurrence of WFCL is neither random, nor occurring 
in isolation. It may show up more frequently in the 
informal spheres of the economy, but its presence is 
path-dependent and contingent on the dynamics and 
strategies employed by actors to manage risk, in both the 
informal and formal economies. 
Using the evidence presented in this Working Paper, 
Figure 4 conceptualises a more detailed theory of change 
about supply chains, the informal economy, and WFCL. 
It is presented as a systems map of the pull factors (blue 
circles), push factors (green circles) and enabling factors 
(yellow circles) that generate WFCL in supply chain 
systems. The evidence in this Working Paper relates 
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as core functioning dynamics of supply chain systems 
that are similar across different sectors, and which raise 
the risk profile of any supply chain systems generating 
WFCL. But these pull factors do not operate as a ‘closed’ 
system, impervious to reinforcing dynamics in the 
socioeconomic system that push people towards WFCL. 
So, where push factors (green circles) and enabling 
factors (yellow circles) seemed particularly important for 
augmenting or sustaining the pull dynamics in the supply 
chain and informal economy, links are included in the 
map. Arrows in the map assume relationships between 
elements. One-way arrows hypothesise causality – for 
example, where one behaviour leads to another. Where 
causality is not clear, or where the research suggests a 
bi-directional relationship, links between elements have 
arrows at both ends.
In the systems map, the formal economy is presented 
as being on a continuum with the informal economy. 
This refers to the findings of Section 4, which show that 
the presentation of formal and informal economies as 
two independent ‘closed’ systems in policy and practice 
is limited for tackling WFCL. The dichotomy is useful 
up until a certain point: both economies have different 
organising logics, and these organising logics create 
different starting points for identifying the dynamics 
underpinning use of WFCL in each. But the literature also 
reveals how a dichotomy obscures our understanding of 
interdependencies, and specifically how behaviour in one 
part of the supply chain system (e.g. a lead firm) affects 
behaviour in another part of the system (e.g. a micro-
entrepreneur), and vice versa. 
The assignment of a risk profile to the formal economy 
(lower risk) and informal economy (higher risk) in the 
systems map represents a key perspective offered in 
Section 5: that supply chains are a conduit for transferring 
risk to the least resilient actors in the system. Supply 
chains are not ‘safe’ socioeconomic entities for small-
scale entrepreneurs, households, and families. This 
raises the possibility that WFCL shows up in supply 
chains when the downward pressure to take on risk 
cannot be matched by the economic resilience to absorb 
that risk. At this point, regions of a supply chain become 
more sensitive to the use of WFCL.
The key strategies and behaviours in supply chains that 
push the system towards use of WFCL are discussed 
in Section 5 and represented in the central dynamics 
of the wider systems map. It illustrates how more tiers 
of a supply chain lead to increased use of the informal 
economy, or work is subcontracted to vulnerable 
individuals because it is stigmatised. Once a supply 
chain is operating in the informal economy, business 
transactions are governed by a different organising logic, 
which is highly networked and relational. 
To manage the risk that is channelled through these 
business-to-business arrangements, three main 
strategies are used: further subcontracting; extensions of 
informal credit; and adaptation of production processes. 
Extensions of informal credit often accompany the 
subcontracting process and co-exist with the use of 
brokers and intermediaries. It is not clear from the 
literature whether the subcontracting and extensions 
of credit structure the existence of intermediaries, or 
whether the intermediaries create the conditions for 
subcontracting and extensions of credit. For the moment, 
the systems map shows this relationship as bi-directional. 
Figure 4 suggests that the business strategies are a 
response to risk, and they propagate further business 
pressure. It is stressful when managing lots of smaller 
suppliers to meet a contract or when at risk of defaulting 
on credit agreements (Haugen 2017). In some cases, the 
coercion of children to work longer hours or to work with 
harmful chemicals may present as the only way to get 
business done.
The conceptual links between strategies to cope with 
supply chain risks and WFCL could be strengthened by 
studies that take an ethnographic and social dialogue 
approach to evidence the causal pathways between 
supply chain design, risk and pressures, strategies 
among small-scale entrepreneurs, and WFCL. An 
informal economy perspective – which learns from 
the business realities and perspectives of owners and 
workers in the informal economy – should be a central 
tenet of this research agenda. Referring back to some of 
the data gaps identified in Sections 3 and 4, an informal 
economy perspective would be strengthened by studies 
that can analyse interrelationships spatially (e.g. urban 
neighbourhood context) and relationally (e.g. structure 
and dynamics of social networks). 
Section 6 hypothesises that emergency situations elevate 
risk and reduce resilience in supply chain systems. While 
the specific links between emergencies and supply chain 
strategies (e.g. subcontracting, lines of credit, adaptation) 
have not been explicitly researched, recent complexity 
economics research into the ecology of leverage suggests 
that credit and debt amplify the implications of shocks 
(e.g. sudden price drops, loss of work) on behaviour. Debt 
can force actions to be taken, and the higher the debt 
ratio, the quicker actors adopt destabilising strategies like 
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selling assets (Thurner, Farmer and Geanakoplos 2011; 
Poledna et al. 2014).
What it has not been possible to identify from the existing 
literature or the systems map presented here is how 
socioeconomic and cultural risks and vulnerabilities 
combine with market pressures and other exogenous 
factors (e.g. natural disasters, migration) to influence 
WFCL. It is possible that different market pressures 
and household pressures, from the minor to the major 
(e.g. from change in price of raw materials to ill health 
or collapsed supply chain) have different implications for 
use of WFCL as an adaptive response, depending on 
the residual resilience and/or latent potential within the 
individual, household or community to respond without 
needing to engage children. For example, we do not have 
economic analysis to explore the types of credit and the 
level of credit thresholds that augment the risk of WFCL in 
supply chain systems. 
By calculating resilience thresholds, we can inform and 
enable dialogue between small-scale entrepreneurs and 
lead international and domestic firms about what needs 
to change, in terms of the design of supply chains, for the 
informal economy to reduce prevalence of WFCL. This 
may include financial mechanisms, such as insurance 
and assurances, to de-risk supply chains. The data could 
be used to promote greater upward accountability in 
supply chains. This way, aspirations around WFCL are 
not singularly crafted by businesses and NGOs residing in 
the formal economy, but reflect a reciprocal appreciation 
of the assets and opportunities that reside in the formal 
and informal spheres of the supply chain to tackle WFCL.
The systems map (Figure 4) points to three enabling 
factors which sustain use of WFCL in supply chain 
systems: poor-quality data; limited flows of information; 
and no audits or regulation. Where we cannot ‘see’ WFCL 
or the dynamics augmenting its use, we cannot concretise 
the problem, and this prevents change from happening. 
Circling back to the overview provided in Section 3, the 
lack of sophistication in the data collected on WFCL goes 
to the heart of debates about ‘Whose reality counts?’ 
in the design and accountability of our socioeconomic 
systems (Chambers 2012). Supply chain management 
is the home of logistics: companies need to know what 
stock they have, on what shelf, in which factory, at any 
given time of the day. These capabilities sit at odds with 
large and persistent data gaps on incidence of WFCL. 
If a research agenda on informal economy perspectives 
and resilience thresholds could be accompanied by 
spatial and trend data on WFCL, then all actors in the 
system – businesses, governments, NGOs, families – will 
be in a much stronger position to identify hotspots and 
track progress.
As a final reflection, it is worth noting that this review 
found few examples of studies and programme 
documents writing confidently about how to make change 
happen. The sector is good at presenting models and 
approaches to articulate the ultimate goal of eradicating 
WFCL but its analysis of the problem context and how 
to operate within it is less sophisticated. As an example, 
a multi-stakeholder approach is generally considered 
good practice, but it is difficult to glean from reports what 
has been learnt about how a diverse array of actors and 
dialogues should be combined in a process of change. 
And there is very little evidence of practitioners working 
with power asymmetries or in ways that proactively 
engage with resistance. 
Given the emphasis within the CLARISSA programme 
on action research, and the significant attention to detail 
in design and in process learning, it is well positioned to 
map out the key design elements, points of process, and 
causal pathways that reduce WFCL in a supply chain 
system. This will be a valuable contribution to the existing 
literature and should help accelerate progress towards 
achieving SDG 8, which calls for an end to child labour 
in all its forms by 2025, including within small enterprises 
and family businesses.
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CLARISSA works by co-developing with stakeholders practical 
options for children to avoid engagement in the worst forms of child 
labour in Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Nepal. 
The participatory processes which underpin the programme 
are designed to generate innovation from the ground which can 
sustainably improve the lives of children and their families.
The programme’s outputs are similarly co-designed and collaboratively 
produced to enhance local ownership of the knowledge, and to ensure 
that our research uptake and engagement strategy is rooted in the 
direct experience of the people most affected on the ground.
